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I
INTRODUCTION

Some of the most vociferous criticisms of the jury relate to its performance
in cases involving business and corporate wrongdoing. The jury's
competence in such cases is assaulted on a variety of fronts. Critics question
the jury's factfinding ability in cases with business and corporate parties, and
doubt whether lay jurors can understand the often complex and esoteric
evidence of business wrongdoing. For example, in a call to replace lay jurors
with scientific experts in toxic tort cases, Dan Drazan has lamented that in
toxic tort trials, "[f]ay jurors are being asked to digest information that is
beyond their reach."' He cites evidence that jurors without the experience
and knowledge necessary to evaluate complicated medical and technical
evidence simply choose to ignore it.2
Others claim that bias and prejudice, rather than evidence, determine jury
decisions about businesses and corporations. The presumed biases cut both
ways. The generally positive regard in which the public holds business is
credited with creating leniency toward business wrongdoing.3 Thus, juries
are accused of being softer on "suite crime" than on "street crime," and of
being reluctant to sanction business wrongdoing with criminal penalties. 4 In
contrast, other critics perceive harsh treatment for businesses in cases that pit
corporations against individual litigants. These commentators maintain that
civil juries penalize corporations for their ample resources, treating them as
deep pockets from which to compensate undeserving victims who have
contributed to their own misfortune. 5 Some writers have even gone so far as
to assert that as long as defendants have enough money, their actual
negligence is of little concern. For instance, Peter Huber has argued that
juries, along with complicit judges, are "committed to running a generous
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sort of charity. If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant after an
6
accident, it will often settle for a merely wealthy one."
One need not subscribe to any of these extreme positions, of course, to
suspect that the jury may have distinctive responses to business and corporate
wrongdoing. Jurors' knowledge of and experiences with business, their
understanding of business transactions, and their beliefs about the
responsibilities of corporations in contemporary society may all play a role in
their determination of liability and damages in specific trials. Yet to date
there have been few systematic analyses of how jurors decide cases involving
businesses and corporations.
This article begins to develop a comprehensive account of jury
decisionmaking in such cases. It starts by showing that suits involving
businesses and corporations form an increasing part of the contemporary
jury's caseload, and thus deserve systematic scrutiny and investigation.
Business presence in the courtroom appears to be increasing in two distinct
ways. First, as a result of a long-term normative shift toward greater business
responsibility for wrongdoing, more lawsuits are brought against businesses
by individuals. Second, there are signs that businesses are using the courts
with greater frequency to resolve disputes among themselves. Thus, today's
juries are more likely than those of the past to decide both cases in which
individuals sue businesses and cases in which businesses sue other businesses.
The issue of jury competence in business cases is best addressed by
analyzing existing research on jury decisionmaking. Two key questions about
jury competence, reflecting two criticisms of the jury in business cases, will be
explored here. First, what are the jury's factfinding abilities in such cases?
Are jurors able to understand and evaluate the specialized technical evidence
so central to the evaluation of much business wrongdoing? Second, in cases
involving individual lawsuits against businesses, are juries biased in their
decisionmaking, either for or against business? By reviewing the best
evidence available, I aim to provide a current picture of the jury confronted
with issues of business and corporate responsibility. I will also discuss
unanswered questions that must be addressed by future research.
II
CASES INVOLVING BUSINESSES AND CORPORATIONS:

AN INCREASING

PART OF THE CONTEMPORARY JURY'S CASELOAD

According to legal scholars, there has been a long-term shift in legal rules
and societal norms regarding the responsibility of businesses to compensate
individuals who have suffered from business-related injuries. 7 In nineteenthcentury America, views and practices that held individuals accountable for
6.
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their own personal injuries (and absolved businesses and corporations from
responsibility) dominated the legal and social terrain. Many bars to recovery
from business and corporate groups existed, including the fellow-servant
rule,8 an expansive assumption of risk doctrine, 9 and a strict doctrine of
contributory negligence,' 0 which prevented recovery if plaintiffs were even
slightly negligent themselves.
Ultimately, however, the sheer number and magnitude of business-related
personal injuries created attitudinal and legal change. Juries (and softhearted
judges) sometimes deviated from the harsh rules precluding recovery for
injured citizens, creating incentives for more lawsuits and, eventually, legal
transformations. The decline of the fellow-servant rule, I the modification of
the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and the
introduction of workers' compensation all increased business responsibility
for harms. The Progressive Movement and the New Deal in the early part of
this century and the civil rights and consumer movements of the 1960's and
1970's, which were accompanied by broad social and attitudinal shifts,
contributed to expectations that collective entities such as governments and
12
businesses had the responsibility to compensate for harms.
Legal historian Lawrence Friedman has contended that in contrast to
American legal culture in the nineteenth century, when Americans were
accustomed to living with calamity and accepted it as part and parcel of life,
twentieth-century American legal culture is characterized by a desire for "total
justice," the expectation of fair treatment and full compensation for
undeserved suffering.' 3 Relying on legal and social changes between the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Donald Black has documented a gradual
movement away from individual responsibility for injury compensation and
toward a collective source of responsibility-the organization. 14 Increased
expectations for total justice may have provided the critical catalyst that led to
greater responsibility for organizations.
8. The fellow-servant rule generally prohibited recovery from an employer if the injury was
caused by a coworker's negligence. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.)
49 (1842). See also Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L.
REV.

50, 53 (1967).

9. Nineteenth-century workers were considered to have assumed the risks or dangers
associated with theirjobs, particularly if they were aware of the risks. See Lamson v. American Axe &
Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144, 58 N.E. 585 (1900). See the discussion in R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H.
KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 467-81 (4th ed. 1984).
10. A contemporary definition of contributory negligence is provided by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 463: "Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below
the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing
cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm." In
the nineteenth century the rule of contributory negligence constituted a complete defense. The rule
continues today in a very small number of states. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, Supra
note 9, at 439-67.
11. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 8.
12. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTALJUSTICE (1985).
13. Id. See alsoJ. LEIBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981).
14. Black, supra note 7.
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By all accounts, the century-long trend toward greater business liability
sharply accelerated from the 1960's to the 1980's. Mass tort cases involving
product injuries from asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and toxic substances
increased dramatically.' 5 Analyses of legal decisions during this period
demonstrate the ascendance of corporate liability principles, although not
without some tension between the traditional doctrines of individual
responsibility and new theories of group liability. 16 Changes in product
liability laws, including strict liability for defective products' 7 and market
share liability, 18 have increased the likelihood of lawsuits and recoveries
against businesses. 19 Indeed, one scholar has described the movement
toward greater civil liability for businesses as one of the most dramatic
20
conceptual revolutions in the Anglo-American legal system.
Several recent cases demonstrate that the list of individual misfortunes for
which businesses and corporations must compensate continues to expand. In
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 2 1 a New Jersey jury awarded $400,000 to a
widower who sued tobacco companies for damages relating to his wife's death
from lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking. A San Francisco jury found a
blood bank liable for $750,000 compensation to the family of a young boy
who developed AIDS after a blood transfusion. 22 And a federal judge issued a
pretrial ruling announcing that, under some circumstances, Atlantic City
23
casinos could be held liable for money lost by drunken gamblers.
In addition to changing legal doctrines and public expectations about
business liability for individual suffering, there is some evidence that
businesses are turning more frequently to the courts to resolve disputes
among themselves. Stewart Macaulay's classic study of dispute resolution in
the business world, published in 1963, demonstrated that large manufacturers
15.
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the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
20. Priest, supra note 19. Priest writes that: "Modern tort law generates complicated legal and
economic issues-of industrywide apportionment of liability, probabilistic causation, and retroactive
liability-that would have appeared bizarre to a lawyer dealing with defective products in the 1950s
whose practice was one of warranty interpretation and routine negligence." Id. at 462.
21. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., U.S. District Court, No. 83-2864 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, and remanded, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
22. Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 891-642 (San Francisco Super. Ct.), Nat'l. L.J., Dec.
19, 1988, at 6.
23. The judge relied on New Jersey's dram-shop laws holding taverns responsible for damages
caused by drunken customers to rule that "a casino has a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting
" Smith & Sorra,
an invitee to gamble where that patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated ...
Casinos May Be Held Liable For Drunken Patrons' Losses, Wall St. J., June 23, 1989, at B1, col. 3.
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went to great lengths to avoid the courts. 24 Yet Marc Galanter has reported
data indicating significant increases over the last two decades of federal court
filings in a variety of forms of commercial litigation. 25 Most striking was the
change in contract-dispute filings, which increased 258 percent from 1960 to
1986, compared to a 114 percent increase in tort filings. 2 6 Other types of
cases connected to business disputes, such as those involving intellectual
27
property and bankruptcy, also showed significant increases over that period.
Not surprisingly, more of these cases are being decided by juries. Mark
Peterson analyzed state and federal jury trials in Cook County, Illinois, and
San Francisco, California, from 1960 to 1984.28 Jury trials in
business/contract cases increased notably over the two decades in both
jurisdictions.2 9 Indeed, in the 1980's, a quarter of all San Francisco jury trials
concerned a business or contract dispute. 30 Noting that San Francisco
County and Santa Clara County, home of Silicon Valley, were the two
California counties with the highest rates of business/contract dispute jury
trials, Peterson attributed this fact to the substantial commercial activity in
both counties. 3' Yet even in jurisdictions without such concentrated business
enterprises, the number of jury trials pertaining to business was still
significant. Business/contract disputes accounted for 14 percent of all civil
jury trials in the state of California in the 1980's.32 If the percentage of
business/contract jury trials (14 percent) is combined with two other frequent
types of civil trials involving businesses-product liability trials (12 percent)
and work injury trials (8 percent)-it is evident that at least a third (34
percent) of California civil jury trials in the early 1980's involved issues of
business or corporate responsibility. In Cook County, one of every five cases
fell into one of these three categories. 3 3 Thus, across jurisdictions, a
substantial percentage of civil jury trials centers on questions involving
business and corporate responsibility.
24. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55
(1963).
25. Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 921, 925, Table i.
26. Id. at 942.
27. Galanter speculates on the causes of such changes, including the rise in corporate mergers
and acquisitions, the growth of franchises, subsidiaries, and other complexities in relations among
businesses, greater competition in international markets, and the increase in lawyers. Id. at 942-46,
953-54. For further elaboration see M. Galanter & J. Rogers, The Transformation of American
Business Disputing? Some Preliminary Observations (June 1988) (unpublished paper delivered at
the 1988 Meeting of the Law and Society Ass'n).
28. M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN
CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

(1987).

29. Id. at 11, Table 2.3. In San Francisco from 1960-1964, there were 41 business/contract jury
trials; the number jumped to 152 during the 1980-1984 time period. Similarly, in Cook County,
there were just 17 business/contract jury trials during 1960-1964. Two decades later the number of
business/contract jury trials was 286.
30.

Id. at 14.

31.

Id. at 41.
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The available aggregate statistics demonstrating an increased business
presence in the courts do not reveal the range and diversity of the types of
cases and issues confronting juries. It is clearly too simplistic to assume that
juries take a unidimensional approach to all business cases. Consider, for
example, the dramatically different concerns likely to be raised when juries
evaluate product liability matters, trademark infringements, antitrust
violations, and stockholder class-action lawsuits. In particular, cases in which
individuals sue businesses and in which businesses sue each other are likely to
diverge. A comprehensive theory of jury decisionmaking in business cases
cannot be developed without more precise and detailed information about the
use of the courts by businesses. A large-scale research program examining
the changes in business disputes is now under way at the University of
Wisconsin and should help to provide a clearer picture of what kinds of issues
jurors are asked to decide in such cases. 34 Despite our current dearth of
detailed knowledge, historical and recent trends clearly show that the
contemporary jury is more likely than ever before to hear cases with
35
businesses and corporations as parties.
III
THE JURY'S FACTFINDING ABILITIES IN CASES OF BUSINESS AND
CORPORATE WRONGDOING

Because a significant proportion of the jury's work involves the evaluation

of business liability, it is important to determine jurors' competence in this
area. Are business and corporate cases so far outside the typical juror's
experience that juries regularly make factfinding errors? A comprehensive
answer to this question would require thorough analyses of jury
decisionmaking across different kinds of cases, because some types of cases
pose greater challenges to juror comprehension than others. For example,

knowledge of the business world might be critical to understanding key issues
in certain disputes between businesses (such as antitrust or contract cases) but
would be less germane to grasping central issues in disputes between
individuals and businesses (such as product liability or worker recovery suits).
We are not yet close to a full understanding of jury competence in business
cases, but a review of past research on jury decisionmaking can provide some
pertinent insights.
34. M. Galanter &J. Rogers, supra note 27; M. Galanter, S. Macaulay, T. Palay &J. Rogers, The
Transformation of American Business Disputing (Jan. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, Disputes
Processing Research Program, University of Wisconsin).
35. In some jurisdictions, businesses have long been a frequent target of lawsuits. Stephen
Daniels has indicated that the two most frequently sued entities in Springfield, Illinois, at the turn of
the century were coal-mining companies and railroads. According to his research, plaintiffs did not
win very often, but they nevertheless sued the two deepest pockets in the community with some
regularity. Personal communication with S. Daniels (Oct. 29, 1988). Historical research analyzing
the frequency and outcomes of court cases over time would be necessary to determine whether
plaintiffs in this community are more likely to bring suit or to prevail today, a pattern that would be
consistent with the argument advanced here.
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Before turning to the general body of research on jury decisionmaking, it
is worth noting that specific concerns have been raised about jury competence
in extremely complex civil litigation. There has been extensive scholarly
debate about whether there is a complexity exception to the seventh
amendment right to a civil jury. Are there civil cases so difficult for juries to
understand that the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires an
alternative tribunal? The circuits are split on the issue, with the Third Circuit
finding a complexity exception3 6 and the Ninth Circuit denying such an
exception. 3 7 The extensive review of this controversy by other scholars 38 will
not be reviewed here, except to note two points important to our discussion.
First, many of the most complex trials confronting the justice system involve
businesses and corporations.3 9 Indeed, the Third and Ninth Circuit cases that
led to contrary appellate decisions about a seventh amendment complexity
exception. both involved massive business enterprises. The second point is
that empirical evidence bearing on jurors' factfinding abilities in complex
cases is quite sparse. 40 Much of the debate over jurors' limitations is based on
speculation rather than evidence.
A.

General Findings About Jury Competence

The evaluation of the jury's competence in factfinding has been a central
interest of jury researchers. 4 ' Although the vast majority of studies of jury
competence have examined criminal trials, the work still furnishes a useful
background for our discussion of jury competence in trials involving
businesses.
Researchers in the University of Chicago Law School's Jury Project in the
1950's were among the first to investigate empirically the jury's factfinding
competence. Researchers Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel 42 compared actual
verdicts reached by juries with hypothetical verdicts rendered by judges
36. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated,
631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
37.
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
38. See, e.g., Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases andjury Trials: A Reply to Professor
Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1980); Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1982); Lempert, Civi juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68
(1981); Oakes, The Right to Strike the jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243
(1980); Sperlich, The Case for Preserving Trial by jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 65 JUDICATURE 394
(1982).
39. J. CECIL, E. LIND & G. BERMANT, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 12, Table 1 (1987).
40.

"Although various views have been expressed about the practical abilities of jurors, there

has been little substantive research done on the subject." In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 430.
"Neither the social science community nor the legal profession has furnished the courts with the
information needed for empirically grounded judgments about the capacity of juries to rationally
decide the issues posed by complex civil suits." Lempert, supra note 38, at 70-71.
41. J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 113-29
(1986); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 119-39 (1988); R. MACCOUN,
GETrING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR (1987).

42.

H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil jury, 50

VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964).
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presiding over the same cases. In both criminal and civil trials, there was a
high rate of judge-jury agreement: Judges agreed with juries 78 percent of
the time. 43 When disagreement occurred in criminal cases, juries tended to
favor the defendant's acquittal more than judges did, 4 4 but in civil cases the
disagreements were evenly balanced between plaintiff and defendant
verdicts.4

5

Kalven and Zeisel addressed the issue ofjury competence by analyzing the
characteristics of criminal cases in which judge and jury disagreed. Judges
rated the trial evidence as easy, somewhat difficult, or very difficult to
comprehend. The researchers reasoned that if juries differed from judges
because juries fundamentally misunderstood the evidence, then the
disagreement rate would be higher in the more difficult cases. No such
pattern was found. Judges and juries were just as likely to disagree in the
cases with easy and difficult evidence, 4 6 leading Kalven and Zeisel to conclude
that the jury generally does not misunderstand the evidence. Few, if any, of
the criminal cases in the Kalven and Zeisel study appeared to involve
47
businesses or corporations.
Two other studies of jury competence in criminal trials used regression
techniques to determine the contribution of trial evidence, case
characteristics, and extralegal variables to juror judgments or verdicts. 4 Both
studies revealed that reactions to criminal cases were strongly grounded in
legally relevant evidence, suggesting that the jury performed in a generally
competent manner. In contrast, however, Baldwin and McConville concluded
from their study of British juries that a significant number of jury verdicts,
49
particularly acquittals, were questionable.
Supporters of the jury have frequently noted that an important
enhancement ofjury competence is the group deliberation, where jurors have
the opportunity to discuss and debate the evidence and correct one another's
factual misunderstandings. 50 Empirical evidence from mock-jury studies
confirms that the group nature of the deliberation can provide protection
against individual factfinding errors. In their study of mock juries in a
criminal trial, Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod, and Nancy Pennington found that
during deliberation, jurors tended to correct one another's factual
misunderstandings. 5' In a separate study using the same mock-trial evidence,
43. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 42, at 58, Table 12 (criminal trials); id.at 63, Table 16
(civil trials).
44. Id. at 58, Table 12.
45. Id. at 63, Table 16.
46. Id. at 157, Table 50.
47. Id. at 66-81. A companion volume discussing the results of some 4000 civil jury trials, which
presumably would have included a number of cases involving businesses and corporations, was
promised, id.at 63 n. 11, but never materialized.
48. Myers, Rule Departures and Aaking Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 781
(1979); Visher, Jury Decision Nfaking: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987).
49. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE,JURY TRIALS (1979). But see V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note
41, at 118-20 for a fuller discussion of Baldwin and McConville's work.
50. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 120.
51. R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 88-89 (1983).
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Phoebe Ellsworth also discovered that simulated jurors were likely to correct
one another on factual matters. 52 In the study by Hastie and his colleagues,
individual jurors' memories of facts and judicial instructions were not
substantial; however, when their recollections were pooled, the groups
remembered 90 percent of the evidence and 80 percent of the judge's
instructions. 53 The collective wisdom of the jury can thus counteract
individual memory failings. The research all indicates that, for garden-variety
criminal trials, the jury is generally a competent factfinder.
In contrast, jury researchers are nearly unanimous in giving the jury poor
marks for its understanding of legal instructions. 54 Thejury's difficulties have
been attributed to the characteristically complex language in which legal
instructions are written and the circumstances under which they are
presented. Jurors' comprehension of legal instructions may be improved by
such changes as rewriting, 5 5 instructing jurors at both the beginning and the
end of the trial, 56 and incorporating other procedural modifications. 5 7
However, deliberating jurors do not appear to be as able to police themselves
when they make legal misstatements as they are when making factual
misstatements. 58 The conclusion emerging from these studies of jury
decisionmaking is that the jury is generally a competent factfinder, although it
has difficulty understanding and applying legal instructions.
Although most research on the jury has examined the criminal jury, the
majority of cases involving businesses occur in the civil context. The
determination of liability and damages rather than criminal responsibility, as
well as other differences between civil and criminal procedure, could well
affect jury decisionmaking competence. Work on civil jury decisionmaking is
increasing and promises to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge. 5 9
Interestingly, however, lay persons often blur the distinctions between the
52.

Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205.

53.

R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 51, at 81.

54.

For general discussions, see V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 120-27; Elwork & Sales,

Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280 (S. Kassin & L.

Wrightsman eds. 1985). Recent empirical demonstrations ofjurors' difficulty with legal instructions
may be found in V. Smith, The Psychological and Legal Implications of Pre-Trial Instruction in the
Law (1987) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University); E. Wiggins, Procedural
Innovations to Enhance Juror Comprehension in Complex Litigation (1987) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University).
55. A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982);
Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminaljury Instructions, 17
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982).
56. V. Smith, supra note 54.
57. Heuer & Penrod, IncreasingJurors' Participationin Trials: A Field Experiment withJury Notetaking
and Question Asking, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988). Heuer and Penrod found no clear evidence
that juror notetaking and question asking increased juror performance on a multiple-choice test of
legal issues, but they discovered a number of other benefits from the two procedures.
58. Ellsworth, supra note 52 at Parts IV. A, B.
59. J. GUINTHER, supra note 41 ; R. MACCOUN, supra note 41; Bordens & Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil
Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989); Horowitz &
Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, PlaintifPopulation Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated
CivilJury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209 (1988).
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criminal and civil justice systems, suggesting that the approaches juries take to
60
deciding civil and criminal responsibility may overlap substantially.
B.

Distinctive Features of Business and Corporate Cases That May Affect
Jury Competence

Now let us turn more directly to the question of jury competence in
business and corporate cases. There are a number of reasons why jury
factfinding might differ in cases involving questions of business and corporate
wrongdoing. Perhaps most centrally, these cases involve a different type of
party-a fact that has some implications for the jury's enterprise. It may be a
more straightforward task for individual jurors to conceptualize and apply a
reasonable person standard than a reasonable corporation standard.
Knowledge of prevailing norms and standards of care in the business world
could be essential to understanding and assessing whether companies were
negligent in specific instances.
Complicating the picture is the thorny problem of evaluating group
responsibility for a harm. Consider the case of the Ford Motor Company's
criminal trial on charges of reckless homicide for the deaths of three
teenagers whose Ford Pinto gas tank exploded after a rear-end crash. The
jury acquitted the automobile company in the criminal trial. After the
acquittal, commentators noted the complications in trying to establish
criminal intent and impose criminal liability on a corporate entity when those
61
issues traditionally have focused on individuals.
Other factors may also affect jury decisionmaking in business cases. The
nature of the evidence may differ substantially between business and nonbusiness cases. For example, both the quantity and the complexity of
scientific and economic data in business cases are likely to be much greater
than in criminal or ordinary tort cases. Finally, people may have biases and
preconceptions about businesses and corporations that affect their
decisionmaking.
C.

Empirical Research on Jury Factfinding in Business Cases

1. Case Studies. Two recent case studies of jury performance in complex
civil trials involving corporations provide some interesting though incomplete
information about how jurors approach these cases. One was an antitrust case
involving a dispute among businesses, while the other concerned a product
liability trial in which individual plaintiffs sued companies. The study of the
antitrust trial indicates both strengths and weaknesses ofjury decisionmaking.
Austin interviewed members of two civil juries that heard the same
60. O'Barr and Conley discovered that the plaintiffs they interviewed in small claims court often
confused criminal and civil trial concepts. O'Barr & Conley, Lay Expectations of the CiviJustice System,
22 LAW & Soc'v REv. 137 (1988).
61. F. CULLEN, W. MAAKESTAD & G. CAVENDER, CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATrACK (1987);
Swigert & Farrell, Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the Creation of Deviance, 15 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 161 (1980-1981).
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complicated antitrust case. 62 The second jury was assembled after the first
jury had been unable to reach a verdict. In discussing and evaluating the
jurors' understanding of the case, Austin distinguished between their ability
to comprehend what he labeled "primary" facts (historical facts, technological
facts, and behavioral facts) and "economic" facts (judgments of economic
effects, often involving market performance and statistical predictions).
Austin concluded that the jurors he interviewed had a good grasp of the
primary facts in the antitrust case, but they had difficulty understanding
economic facts. This conclusion is consistent with other findings indicating
that the American public is deficient in understanding basic economic
principles. 63 More research should examine this potential problem across a
range of cases, but for now the problem raises an immediate concern about
juries in business cases, many of which include financial and economic data.
In a second case study, Rand researchers Molly Selvin and Larry Picus
studied jurors in a complex trial involving liability for injuries from
asbestos.

64

The case involved four plaintiffs who had been exposed to

different amounts of asbestos and who had varying degrees of physical
infirmity. The plaintiffs' doctors argued that all four suffered from asbestosis,
but the defense countered with two medical experts who asserted that three
of the four did not have asbestosis. The jury found for the plaintiffs.
Selvin and Picus interviewed jurors after the trial to assess their
understanding of the causal arguments regarding asbestosis as well as their
approach to decisions about liability and damages. They concluded that the
jurors seriously misunderstood the development of asbestosis. Jurors tended
to believe that everyone exposed to asbestos would fall victim to the disease
and that all the plaintiffs would ultimately become as ill as the most seriously
injured plaintiff in the lawsuit. In fact, asbestosis can have a range of effects.
Some critics might maintain that the jury's failure to understand the
progress of asbestosis constitutes evidence of the jury's inherent
incompetence in evaluating complex technical matters. However, by
examining the presentation of the medical testimony and jurors' inferences
from the testimony, one can observe that the adversary nature of the
65
presentation of evidence led directly to the jury's factual misunderstanding.
The plaintiffs' expert evidence suggested to jurors that asbestosis always
reached the same dreadful terminal phase, apparently leading them to
conclude that all four of the plaintiffs would be as severely injured as the
62. A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY (1984).
63. Carmody, Many Students Fail Quiz on Basic Economics, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1988, at A1, col. 2.
The article reported the results of a study sponsored by the Joint Council on Economic Education
showing that more than half of 8205 high school students given a multiple-choice test could not
define such terms as inflation, profit, and government budget deficit.
64. M. SELVIN & L. Picus, THE DEBATE OVERJURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT
ASBESTOS CASE (1987).

65.

"Because neither the plaintiffs' nor the defendants' attorneys had provided the jury with

much information on the variable nature of asbestosis, once the jurors decided each plaintiff did
indeed have asbestosis, they concluded that each would become as sick as [the sickest plaintiff]." Id.
at 41.
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sickest one. The defense made an equally self-interested tactical decision to
deny completely that three of the four plaintiffs had asbestosis. We can
surmise that it was not perceived to be in the interest of either adversary to
present jurors with information about the true range and variability of the
disease. Thejoint strategies of plaintiff and defendant thus left the jury in the
dark.
The Rand study is but one example of a more general predicament that is
apt to affect both judges and juries alike. The adversarial presentation of
complex technical evidence through expert witnesses is likely to lead to
evaluation problems for the decisionmaker. Part of the jury's unique strength
as a factfinder is that jurors rely on a range of insights and background
experiences in evaluating trial evidence. Because technical evidence is
frequently outside the direct experience of the jurors, they are less able to use
their own knowledge and experience as checks on the gaps and exaggerations
in evidence presented within the adversary format. In many cases, technical
evidence may not be effectively corrected by cross-examination or by the
presentation of an opposing expert. 6 6 Injudgingjury competence, one needs
to recognize that often the jury will be evaluating evidence under less than
optimal conditions. Yet one cannot forget that the major alternative to the
jury-the judge-is also likely to be unschooled in techniques of evaluating
complex technical evidence. 6 7 Further analyses may show that factfinding
errors are not necessarily the result of weaknesses intrinsic to judge or jury
but rather potentially correctable problems in the presentation of technical
and complex evidence.
While these case studies add to our understanding of the way individual
juries perform and point to specific topics in which juries may need guidance,
it is difficult to know the extent to which they have identified problems
common to all such jury trials or specific difficulties that arose in the
individual trials. Jury performance in specific trials can be affected by the
manner in which complex information is presented, the communication
abilities of the experts, tactical decisions about evidence inclusion, and so on.
Thus, it is useful to examine performance issues across a wider range of trials.
2. More General Research. Systematic study of jury decisionmaking in
business and corporate cases is just beginning. 68 However, some insights into
66.

See, e.g.,

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS

156-

64 (S. Fienberg ed. 1989) [hereinafter EVOLVING ROLE].

67. Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical Evidence, A Social Science Perspective, in EVOLVING ROLE,
id. at 279-319 (reviewing additional data showing that judges are not immune from factual
misunderstandings). Furthermore, the factfinding situation may be more demanding in judge-only
trials. A Federal Judicial Center survey of attorneys and judges in lengthy federal trials discovered
that lawyers often worked hard to present complex evidence in streamlined and more coherent form
for jury trials. Attorneys rarely engaged in the same kind of efforts in judge-only trials. G. BERMANT,
J. CECIL, A. CHASET, E. LIND & P. LOMBARD, PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH AND
THE BAR (1981) [hereinafter PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS].
68. The National Science Foundation funded two such projects in 1989. See V. HANS, PUBLIC
VIEWS OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRONGDOING (1989); R. MACCOUN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL
JURY VERDICTS

IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES (1989).

See also Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 59;
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possible areas of strength and vulnerability of juries may be derived from
ongoing research programs on how jurors react to specific types of evidence
commonly found in business cases. By their nature, business and corporate
trials are likely to include medical, scientific, statistical, economic, or financial
testimony. There has been considerable concern that jurors give undue
weight to scientific evidence because it possesses an aura of certainty.
Another fear is that jurors, failing to understand scientific evidence, simply
ignore it.69

Converging with the conclusions of the Austin case study, recent research
suggests that statistical and economic data present particular difficulties for
lay factfinders. William Thompson's line of experimental research indicates
that probability evidence is likely to be misinterpreted by those who are
untrained in mathematics and statistics.

70

In experimental studies in which

mock jurors were presented with scientific and quantitative evidence, Jane
Goodman found that, contrary to the beliefs of critics ofjury competence, the
presentation of scientific evidence was not ignored, nor did it overwhelm
other factors in jurors' judgments. 7 ' She did discover, however, errors in
comprehension of quantitative evidence. New work on how jurors assess
damages demonstrates substantial variability 72 and some evaluation
problems. 73 Indeed, the Fienberg volume concluded that statistical evidence
74
presents demanding challenges to both judges and juries.
Although simulation studies show that jurors may sometimes
misunderstand technical evidence, the overall impact of comprehension
errors on the part of individual jurors may prove to be modest. Full and
competent adversarial examination of disputed technical issues, visual aids,
and group deliberation may counteract individual errors so that the group
decision is a competent one. 7 5 In a Federal Judicial Center interview study
with judges and lawyers who participated in protracted and often difficult
trials, the judges and lawyers favorably noted the diligence of juries in their
cases and were generally supportive of the juries' decisionmaking. 76 The
Diamond, Blindfolding thejury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 247; Horowitz & Bordens,
supra note 59.
69. See Vidmar, supra note 67.
70. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence, LAW C CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1989, at 9. Of course, this limitation is not exclusively the province ofjurors. Judges, too,
make errors in interpreting probability evidence.
71. J. Goodman,Jurors' Comprehension of Scientific Evidence (June 1988) (unpublished paper
delivered at the 1988 Meeting of the Law & Society Ass'n).
72. See Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 225.
73. Id at Part IV.B.3 (discussing the research that she, Goodman, and Loftus have conducted on
how jurors determine damages).
74.

EVOLVING ROLE, supra note 66.

75. One interesting question about the potentially corrective effect of group deliberation is
whether errors in comprehension of scientific facts are corrected during deliberation by other jurors.
Several researchers have discovered that jurors tend to correct one another.s factual but not legal
misstatements. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58. When it comes to being corrected by other
jurors, do technical matters resemble factual or legal matters?
76. PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS, supra note 67, at 52.
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judges and lawyers were asked whether their trials had contained difficult
issues. The report concludes: "Almost without exception, respondents who
acknowledged the existence of difficult issues in their jury trials also
mentioned explicitly that the jury had made the correct decision or that the
77
jury had no difficulty applying the legal standards to the facts."
3. Jury Selection. Jury selection and composition constitute another
important factor affecting the competence of jury decisionmaking in business
trials. Many lengthy trials involve businesses and corporations. Examining
who serves on juries in complex and lengthy trials, one observes a not
altogether surprising phenomenon. In a study conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center, jurors in very lengthy federal trials were less likely to be
college educated and more likely to be unemployed than jurors in shorter
trials. 78 One source of this pattern may be that employed jurors are more
likely to request excuses. As a lawyer who participated in one protracted trial
quipped, "No one who earns a decent living could afford to be on this jury." 79
A second possibility is that prospective jurors with experience and
knowledge of the business world may be disproportionately excluded through
lawyers' peremptory challenges. Adversarial attorneys desire favorable
jurors, and if business knowledge could interfere with acceptance of their
theory of the case, they may use peremptory challenges to try to obtain a less
informed jury. Consider the results of pretrial mock-jury research in the
"Chevymobile" engine-switch case.8 0 Plaintiffs argued that General Motors
breached its warranty when the company, without informing consumers,
installed a nonstandard engine in some car models. General Motors
couniered that the engines were comparable products and that interchanging
parts was standard practice in the auto industry. During a pretrial jury
simulation sponsored by the plaintiffs, one mock juror who was an employee
of an import company argued that interchanging component parts was
common in her business; her mock jury decided in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiffs' attorneys were thus forewarned to challenge jurors with similar
occupational backgrounds.
Through both excuses and challenges,
prospective jurors who are sophisticated about business may be less likely to
sit as jurors in business cases.
D.

Summary

This review of issues and evidence pertaining to jury factfinding in
business/corporate trials highlights several areas in which more research and
study are needed. Prior research on jury decisionmaking provides us with
some confidence that juries generally render competent verdicts. However,
77. Id. at 26.
78. J. CECIL, E. LIND & G. BERMANT, supra note 39, at 19, Table 4. Jurors in longer trials were
also more likely to be women and to be unmarried.
79.

PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS, supra note 67, at 53.

80.

Kassin, Mock Jury Trials, 7 TRIAL DIPL. J. 26 (1984).
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there are some areas where juries may need special assistance. Jurors with
little or no business experience, presented with specialized bodies of scientific
and statistical evidence, may be particularly vulnerable to the limitations of
the adversarial system. Tactical decisions to present a restricted amount of
evidence, coupled with the mandated passive role of the decisionmaker, can
lead to distorted pictures of reality for juries.

IV
JURY BIASES

In addition to having concerns about factfinding competence, some
observers are convinced that jury decisions in business and corporate cases
are infected by prejudice-either for or against the companies. Most
allegations of bias pertain to trials in which corporations are pitted against
individuals, rather than trials involving disputes between businesses. Perhaps
the most popular assertion of bias pertains to personal injury cases, when
individual plaintiffs sue corporations for compensation for business-related
injuries. Juries are alleged to follow a "deep pockets" principle in such cases,
and to award plaintiffs who sue corporations large sums of money because the
jurors presume that the wealthy corporations can afford it.81 Other observers
assert in contrast that the public is so enamored of business that it is
excessively tolerant of corporate wrongdoing, permitting businesses to
82
engage in actions for which individuals would be punished.
Indeed, beliefs about the differential treatment of corporations are so
widespread that a number of jurisdictions have developed pattern jury
instructions that caution jurors that corporations should be treated just the
same as individuals. The Modern Federal Jury Instructions version reads as
follows:
In this case, [one of] the plaintiff(s) (or defendant(s)) is a corporation.
The mere fact that one of the parties is a corporation does not mean it
is entitled to any lesser consideration by you. All persons are equal
81. In an article about the extensive litigation surrounding the Exxon-Valdez oil spill that
caused massive environmental damage in Alaska, one legal consultant maintained: "There are a lot
of people out there who are looking to rape a deep pocket like Exxon ....
Companies like Exxon
have to be tough on litigation to send a message to the plaintiffs' bar that, 'We're not going to mess
around.' " Blum, Exxon After the Spill, Nat'l. LJ., July 3, 1989, at 1, 38. It is notable that the
consultant equated the filing of a personal injury lawsuit with rape, one of the most heinous of
criminal acts, and one that is experienced as deeply violative of a person's integrity.
82. Opponents of the Department of Justice's settlement of E.F. Hutton's "check-kiting"
charges compared Hutton's treatment to that of hypothetical similarly guilty individuals. TheJustice
Department imposed only civil financial penalties on Hutton for a scheme in which checks were
shuffled among banks, creating overdrafts of up to $10 billion. Senator Joseph Biden, D. Del.,
criticized the absence of criminal penalties, noting that "I can name eight of my clients, when I was a
lawyer, who went to jail for check-kiting ....
I'm supposed to go around talking about jailing people
for drunk driving, and you can go out and steal a million dollars and it's, hey, see you around the
club." Welch, Hearing Feels Heat Fron E. F. Hutton Decision, The Morning News (Wilmington, Del.),
May 16, 1985, at A14.
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before the law, and corporations, big or small, are entitled to the same
fair consideration as you would give any other individual party.8 3
General attitudes toward business and corporations may lead jurors to
perceive and treat corporate wrongdoing distinctively. Just as sympathy and
prejudice can be found in the jury box when individuals stand trial, 8 4
stereotypes of corporations could affect perceptions of corporate
wrongdoing. Anti-business attitudes may create harshness, whereas probusiness sentiments may lead to more lenient evaluation and treatment.
Extensive personal experience with business could generate sympathy for
those operating in a business context, but might also produce an insistence on
adherence to prevailing standards of business conduct. Preconceptions about
specific corporations could affect both individual-business cases and businessbusiness disputes. A corporation's reputation, the popularity or social utility
of the product a company manufactures, 8 5 and the size of the business
enterprise could all play a role in jury judgments. Exactly how such potential
biasing factors are translated into liability and damage determinations awaits
empirical investigation.
For all these reasons, it is useful to know whether jurors in corporate cases
bring to their task characteristic predispositions and attitudes about business
that influence their evaluation of liability and damages. Research assessing
juror attitudes toward business cases is limited; but we can gain some insights
about the likely attitudes of jurors by combining the available work on juries
with survey research examining public opinion about businesses and business
wrongdoing.
A.

Attitudes Toward White Collar, Corporate, and Business Wrongdoing

The results of public opinion surveys suggest that the American public has
ambivalent reactions to business. Its expressions of support for business are
greatest when given at a general, abstract level. For example, 86 percent of
respondents in one contemporary survey indicated that they held favorable
views toward business. In their evaluations of major institutions in society,
these respondents ranked business and industry second only to the churches,
83. 3 L. SAND,J. SIFFERT, S. REISS,J. SEXTON &J. THROPE, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CIVIL, 72-2, instruction 72-1 (1988). The model instruction was based on two sources: the Fifth
Circuit's pattern instruction No. 2B ("A corporation is entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as
is a private individual. The law is no respecter of persons, and all persons, including corporations,
stand equal before the law and are to be dealt with as equals in a court ofjustice"), and the Ninth
Circuit's pattern instruction No. 12.12 ("The fact that a plaintiff or defendant is a corporation should
not affect your decision. All persons are equal before the law, and corporations, whether large or
small, are entitled to the same fair and conscientious consideration by you as any other person."). Id.
at 72-2 to 72-3. As Richard Lempert has noted, it would be interesting to vary the presence or
absence of such instructions in a mock-trial setting to determine whether and in what manner jurors
are affected by such instructions. Personal communication with Richard Lempert (Oct. 29, 1988).
84. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 41, at 131-148. Jurors' sympathies and prejudices appear
to affect their verdicts primarily when the facts of the case are close, and either conviction or acquittal
could be justified by the evidence. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 42.
85. Consider the low regard for oil and tobacco companies documented by S. LIPSET & W.
SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT 197, Fig. 6-2 (rev. ed. 1987).
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and above the press, educational institutions, and even the U.S. Supreme
Court.8 6

In another survey, six out of ten respondents selected the free

enterprise system as "the major reason for our higher standard of living" and
"one of the major causes of United States greatness. 8 7 In surveys conducted
in the 1980's, 58 percent agreed that "what's good for business is good for
88
the average person."
Despite the public's overall approval of business, Lipset and Schneider
have documented a decrease in general public support for big business and
business leaders. 8 9 Americans appear to place less confidence in business
now than they did in earlier times. 90 In a similar vein, Francis Cullen, William
Maakestad, and Gray Cavender argue that the public has become increasingly
willing to approve sanctions against the powerful, as a consequence of events
of the 1970's and 1980's that undermined public confidence in major
institutions and challenged the legitimacy of law and the social order. 9 1
There is no evidence that the general public turns a blind or a kind eye to
crimes that occur within business contexts. First of all, the public believes that
business crime is a widespread problem. In a 1986 New York Times survey,
respondents were asked, "There's been a lot of news recently about
individuals and corporations committing white collar crimes to make a profit
for themselves and their companies. How often do you think this happens in
American business?" Fifty-six percent of the respondents thought that it
happened "very often." 92 In another poll 55 percent of the respondents
described most corporate executives as "not honest." 93 Cullen and his
colleagues 94 discovered that their Illinois respondents believed the economic
and moral costs of white collar crime surpassed the costs of street crime.
To determine whether the public is more tolerant of suite crime than of
street crime, opinion surveys have compared people's judgments of the
seriousness of white collar/business crimes and street crimes. 9 5 This
comparative approach, in line with other studies, 96 reveals no evidence of
86. Roper & Miller, Americans Take Stock of Business, 8 PUB. OPINION 12 (1985).
87. Id. at 13.
88. Id. See also S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 85, at 285-89, for other survey results
showing strong support for the free enterprise system.
89. S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 85, at 367-69.
90. It is interesting that in a capitalist democracy there is also evidence of general hostility
toward the profit motive, and particularly toward individuals and companies who make big profits.
See id. at 173-83 for a discussion of public disdain for profits and evidence that the public exaggerates
business profit.
91.
F. CULLEN, W. MAAKESTAD & G. CAVENDER, supra note 61.
92.

Opinion Roundup, 9 PUB. OPINION 21, 22 (1986).

93. Id.
94. Cullen, Mathers, Clark & Cullen, Public Support for Punishing IVhite-Collar Crime: Blaming the
Victim Revisited?, II J. CRIM. JUsT. 481, 487 (1983).
95. Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual
Differences, 39 AM. Soc'' REV. 224 (1974); Wolfgang & Figlio, Ieighing Social Responsibility: How
Perceptions Differ for Individual and Corporate Crimes, WHARTON SCHOOL ECON. ANN. 32 (1985).

96. Cullen, Mathers, Clark & Cullen, supra note 93; Grabosky, Braithwaite & Wilson, The Mvth of
Community Tolerance toward 11'hite-Collar Crime, 20 AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND J. CRIM. 33 (1987);
Roper & Miller, supra note 86.
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leniency toward white collar and business criminals. To the contrary, the
public frequently sees business crime as quite serious and deserving of
punishment. Thus, considerable survey evidence indicates that while
Americans strongly support business, they do not condone corporate
97
misbehavior.
General attitudes toward punishment may also be implicated in responses
to corporate wrongdoing. In the criminal justice arena, individual attitudes
are characteristically clustered around typically liberal "due process" or
typically conservative "crime control" poles, with crime control advocates
more likely to prefer swift and strong punishment. However, as Lee Hamilton
has shown in another context, 98 because desires to punish are linked to the
personality characteristic of authoritarianism, high authoritarians may display
less punitive responses to wrongdoing when it occurs in a hierarchically
ordered environment such as a corporation. 9 9 It is an interesting question for
future research to clarify whether such urges to punish (previously studied
primarily in terms of criminal sanctions) affect jurors' decisions about holding
civil defendants liable for wrongdoing, or whether they drive up damage
awards, or both.
What effect might this mix of attitudes have on juror judgments in
business cases? Generalizing from jury selection research in the criminal
context, 0 0 one would have to say that very general attitudes toward business
are unlikely to constitute strong predictors ofjurors' judgments in particular
cases. Typically the evidence, rather than extralegal or personal factors,
drives juror decisionmaking. It is possible that more highly differentiated sets
of attitudes toward the societal roles and responsibilities of businesses may
affect jurors' evaluation of the evidence and the liability of specific
corporations. The next two sections explore this possibility, taking up two
specific dimensions of corporate and business responsibility, both pertaining
to cases in which corporations and individuals face off in court. First is the
most common charge against juries deciding business cases-that they
operate with a deep pockets mentality. Next is a review of the evidence that

97. A good deal of the work on attitudes toward white collar crime has focused on the United
States, but there is excellent work from both Australia and Great Britain showing similar patterns.
See, e.g., M. LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (1987), for

an examination of British research, and Grabosky, Braithwaite & Wilson, supra note 96, for a summary
of Australian public opinion work.
98. Hamilton, Individual Differences in Ascriptions of Responsibility, Guilt, and AppropriatePunishment, in
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 239 (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth & N. Vidmar eds. 1976).
99. See Kadish, Some Observationson the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, in
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: OFFENSES IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND THE PROFESSIONS 296 (G. Geis & R.
Meier eds. rev. ed. 1977). Kadish observed that political conservatives, who typically support
rigorous punishment for ordinary offenders, seemed less supportive of such punishment for business
offenders. Id. at 297. I am indebted to my colleague David Ermann for bringing this citation to my
attention.
100.

Hans & Vidmar,Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 39 (N. Kerr & R. Bray

eds. 1982). This work is consistent with a larger body of psychological research on the attitudebehavior relationship, a longstanding topic of interest to social psychologists.
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there exists even today a strong tension between individual and corporate
responsibility.
B.

The Deep Pockets Effect: Evidence of an Alternative Standard for
Corporations?

Perhaps the most frequently voiced criticism of juries in business cases is
that juries unfairly consider the financial resources of corporate defendants in
compensating individual plaintiffs. Rand Corporation researchers examined
jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, during the 1960's and 1970's, and
discovered that, in cases with plaintiffs who had serious personal injuries,
corporate and governmental defendants were more likely to be found liable
and to be required to pay larger damage awards than individual
defendants.' 0 No such differences for the defendant's identity were observed
in cases with less serious injuries. The results appeared to provide support
for a deep pockets explanation of jury awards, in which jurors take into
account the financial resources of the defendant when determining
compensatory damages. 10 2 A less pejorative way of describing such jury
awards that depend on the relative resources of the parties is to say that jurors
are balancing the equities of the situation. Rather than inflating awards against
corporate defendants, juries may be discounting awards against individual
defendants because of the perceived deleterious consequences of a large
award.'

0 3

Juries may also be responding to other differences between corporations
and individuals besides their financial resources. One theory about why
people may treat the corporation distinctively focuses on the nonfinancial
resource superiority of organizations over individuals.
The typical
corporation is organized around a rational structure and contains a number of

individuals with specialized skills. On the basis of these characteristics,
corporations may be assumed to possess greater rationality and better ability
to anticipate the consequences of their endeavors than individuals. If
corporations are better able to foresee the consequences of their actions, then
they should be judged more severely for their violations.

More severe

punishment for intentional behavior is, of course, perfectly in line with the
link between intentionality and culpability that characterizes both the criminal
and the civil justice systems. 10 4 The perception that corporations are more
likely to foresee injuries could lead directly to greater presumptions of
101.

A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY
42, Table 4.4 (comparative liability), 43, Table 4.5 (median awards), and 45, Fig. 4.1
(expected median awards) (1985). Other potential explanations for this pattern exist.
102. Of course, juries are instructed to consider the defendant's financial resources in awarding
punitive damages.
103. MacCoun draws on distributive justice research to propose several different hypotheses that
might account for defendant identity effects, including pure need, severe need, equality, or
equity/proportionality. R. MACCOUN, supra note 4 1, at 34-36.
104. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 3-54; J. KAPLAN & R. WEISBERG,
CRIMINAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 131-79 (1986); K. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME:
CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAMEWORTHINESS (1985).
TRIALS
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liability. Desires to sanction a corporation for intentional misbehavior could
then drive up the damage awards.' 0 5 Sociologists and other scholars have
demonstrated numerous instances in which corporations violate principles of
rationality. 0 6 Nevertheless, what would appear as an accidental act when
committed by an individual may seem purposeful when a corporation engages
in the act.
On the other hand, the fact that corporations typically consist of groups of
people is likely to lessen assessments of responsibility for individuals within
the group. A situation in which no single person can be identified as
responsible may inhibit jurors and make them reluctant to pin blame.
Individual members of a group are likely to benefit from the well-documented
phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility within a group. 0 7 A further
contributor to perceptions of decreased responsibility is the fact that many
members of the corporation may have been acting on orders from superiors,
08
and this situation typically reduces judgments of individual culpability.
Therefore, individuals within a corporation are likely to be held less culpable
for wrongdoing.
However, for serious harms, a corporate group might be assigned greater
responsibility than a similarly situated individual. In assigning responsibility
for an extreme event, people tend to infer the existence of multiple necessary
causes such as might be present in group efforts. A single actor may not be
perceived as a sufficient cause for a major disaster. 0 9 For example, in studies
exploring why conspiracy theories of presidential assassinations are so
popular, McCauley and Jacques discovered that groups are seen as more
effective than individuals." l0 When extreme events occur, people appear to
look for substantial causes. This could explain the pattern described above in
the Chin and Peterson study ofjury awards, where differences injury verdicts
105. Stephen Daniels has discovered that punitive damage awards occur primarily in cases
involving intentionally inflicted harms. It is also possible that perceptions of intentionality could lead
to higher compensatory damage awards. Daniels, Punitive Damages: The Real Story, 72 A.B.A.J. 60, 61
(Aug. 1986).
106. M. ERMANN & D. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE DEVIANCE (1982).
107. Darley & Latane, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 377 (1968); Wilder, Social Categorization: Implicationsfor Creation and
Reduction of Intergroup Bias, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz ed.
1986).
108. H. KELMAN & V. HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989).
109. In this context it is interesting to note that in both the Exxon Alaskan oil spill and the
Bhopal disaster, specific individuals could have been viewed as responsible for the harm: the
allegedly drunken captain of the Valdez, cf Egan, Exxon Concedes It Can't Contain Most of Oil Spill, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 30, 1989, at Al, col. 1, and a disgruntled employee at the Bhopal plant, cf Labaton,
Plaintiffs Faced Major Hurdles, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D3, col. 1. My analysis suggests that
attempts to blame single individuals for disasters of these magnitudes might have been unsuccessful.
And this hypothesis is borne out as well in the recent outcome of Captain Hazelwood's criminal trial
in Alaska. State v. Hazelwood (Alaska Super.) (Nos. 3AN-89-7217 Cr., 3-AN-89-7218), Mar. 23,
1989, appealfiled, Apr. 13, 1990.
110. McCauley & Jacques, The Popularity of Conspiracy Theories of Presidential Assassinations, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 637 (1979); see also Latane, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 343 (1981).
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between individuals and governmental and business groups emerged only
when the plaintiffs were severely injured. I''
To explore some of these issues about judgments of corporate versus
individual responsibility, David Ermann and I conducted an experiment in
which we varied the identity of the defendant.' 12 We altered the actor in an
otherwise identical scenario involving harm to workers. Half the respondents
learned that a Mr. Jones had hired five workers to clear some recently
purchased land, while the remainder were told that the Jones Corporation had
done so. After a few hours of work, the workers began feeling ill. They
continued working after notifying Jones, but then experienced more severe
symptoms. Ultimately, all the workers required medical care, and three of
them needed hospitalization. Analysis of the debris on the land revealed the
presence of a highly toxic chemical. The workers ultimately sued Jones for
damages relating to the incident, and the local prosecutor brought criminal
charges against Jones. After reading either the "Mr. Jones" or the "Jones
Corporation" version of the scenario, the respondents acted as mock jurors to
decide Jones' civil and criminal responsibility.
We found striking differences in the way that people perceived and
responded to corporate wrongdoing. The respondents believed' that the
corporation was more likely to have known beforehand that the workers might
be harmed. Despite the identical actions of Mr. Jones and the Jones
Corporation, the respondents saw the corporation as more reckless, more
morally wrong, and more blameworthy. They were more likely to judge that
theJones Corporation was civilly and criminally culpable. Consistent with the
Chin and Peterson archival analyses,' 13 the amount awarded to the plaintiffs
suing the Jones Corporation was almost twice the amount awarded to
plaintiffs suing Mr. Jones. The results of the experiment indicated that people
have a distinctive'view of corporate as opposed to individual wrongdoing.
To explore why our respondents had differential reactions to the
individual and the corporation, we analyzed the subjects' responses using
multiple-regression techniques. We discovered that judgments of civil and
criminal liability and awards were most strongly related to beliefs about
intentionality and recklessness in both the Mr. Jones and the Jones
Corporation conditions. Surprisingly, the awards of the plaintiffs suing the
Jones Corporation were not significantly related to judgments of financial
resources (measured in our study by respondents' estimates of the likelihood
of insurance and bankruptcy), which would have been predicted by a deep
pockets explanation.
The overall pattern of results led us to hypothesize that people employed a
different, and higher, standard in evaluating corporate wrongdoing. We
speculated that the imposition of a higher standard could be due to our
11i. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, supra note 101.
112. Hans & Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & Hum.
151 (1989).
113. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, supra note 101.
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respondents' perceptions of the nonfinancial resource superiority of
corporations. However, the design of our study did not permit us to rule out
an alternative explanation, namely that negative stereotypes of corporations
predisposed our respondents to take a relatively harsh view of corporate
behavior. Future work will attempt to tease out these different explanations
14
for the observed differentiation of individual and corporate responsibility."
C.

The Tension between Corporate and Individual Responsibility: The
Tobacco Company Cases

Signs of a long-term shift toward greater collective and corporate
responsibility" t 5 and evidence that the public desires punishment for
business crime and is willing to hold corporations to high standards might
suggest that juries today insist on corporate and business responsibility under
most if not all circumstances. But that is telling only part of the story. There
are considerable tensions and subtleties in the views juries take in cases in
which corporate responsibility and individual responsibility are counterposed.
Indeed, substantial portions of the citizenry actively resist attributing
responsibility to corporate and business entities under many circumstances.
Many members of the public continue to adhere strongly to the ethic of
individual responsibility. One of the most compelling illustrations of this
tendency is given by David Engel's sensitive portrait of a small rural Illinois
community, the majority of whose members remained -hostile to the use of
lawsuits for personal injury compensation.' 16 Plaintiffs were seen as
troublemakers. Transforming a personal injury into a claim against another
individual or a business was viewed as an attempt to escape responsibility for
one's own actions. The community members' lay views reflected the
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, both of which
focus on what the victim could have done to prevent injury.
Such preferences for individual responsibility are not the sole province of
small rural districts, but may be found in larger communities as well. People
differ substantially in the extent to which they hold individuals or external
conditions responsible for events.' '7 National Jury Project researchers have
developed a continuum to describe prospective jurors' views, from the
"personal responsibility" perspective, where complete responsibility is
attributed to individuals for adversity, to the "social responsibility"
perspective, where more credit is given to environmental and social factors.

Prospective jurors with a personal responsibility perspective are more
reluctant than others to hold groups such as businesses or municipalities
114.

Such work has begun only recently. See V. HANS, supra note 68; R. MACCOUN, supra note 68.
115. See supra text at 178-80.
116. Engel, Law, Time, and Community, 21 LAW & Soc'v REV. 605 (1987); Engel, The Oven Birds
Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and PersonalInjuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'y REV. 551 (1984).
117. NATIONALJURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (2d ed. 1987). See also Vidmar
& Schuller, Individual Differences and the Pursuit of Legal Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry, II LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 299 (1987), documenting substantial differences among people in "claims consciousness,"
the extent to which they will perceive and act upon claims.
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responsible for harms, particularly when the plaintiff contributes in even a
minor way to the harm.' 18
Tensions exist between individual and corporate responsibility. Consider
the following question: What is the moral and financial responsibility of large
companies that market an admittedly dangerous product (with little if any
socially redeeming value) directly linked to thousands of deaths and severe
injuries per year? If asked this question in the abstract in the 1980's, one
might be tempted to reply that the companies' culpability is obvious. Yet,
when confronted with the concrete situation of the tobacco companies'
marketing and sale of cigarettes, most juries and the majority of the public
have been willing to absolve the companies from responsibility for the
physical harms caused by smoking. Indeed, the stunning litigation successes
of the tobacco companies, and interviews with the jurors who decided those
cases, illustrate that there are limits to business responsibility. Before 1988,
the tobacco companies prevailed in every one of some 300 lawsuits against
them. Interviews of jurors in two past trials that ended in victories for the
tobacco companies showed that jurors felt reluctant to hold tobacco
companies liable when smokers knew-or should have known-of the
harm.' 19 As one juror said, "People are responsible for their own smoking,
whether tobacco companies advertise or not. A person with any common
sense whatsoever is going to recognize that smoking is bad for you. I don't
believe the companies can be held responsible .... .120
The Cipollone case, decided in 1988, was the first case in which a jury
awarded money to a plaintiff against a tobacco company for smoking
injuries. 12 ' Yet even in this case, the jury awarded money not to the estate of
the smoker, Rose Cipollone, who was judged to be 80 percent responsible for
her own injuries and cancer death, but rather to her widowed husband. And
in a complex opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently set aside
22
the verdict and remanded the case for retrial.'
Within two weeks of the Cipollone jury verdict, I surveyed a convenience
sample of 105 Delaware adults about their views of the case.' 2 3 We asked our
respondents whether they had heard "about the NewJersey jury verdict a few
weeks ago in a case against a tobacco company." Three-quarters of our
respondents (73 percent) had heard about the case, but most said they had
118. NATIONALJURY PROJECT, supra note 117, at § 13.02[1].
119. Gidmark, The Tobacco Juries-An In-Depth Study, 10 TRIAL DiPL. J. 18 (1987).
120. Id. at 26.
121. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., U.S. District Court, No. 83-2864 (D.NJ. 1988). The jury
found that the cigarette company was responsible for pre-1966 actions, including failure to warn of
tobacco's dangers and breaching express warranties. For interesting discussions of the case and its
implications, see Blum, Tobacco Litigation: Cipollone and Its Progeny, I1 Nat'l. L.J. 20 (Dec. 26, 1988-Jan.
2, 1989); Daynard & Morin, The Cipollone Documents: Following the Paper Trail to Tobacco Industry
Liability, 24 TRIAL 50 (1988).
122. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
123. We sampled adults who were at Market Street Mall in downtown Wilmington, Delaware, at
lunchtime. It was a nonrepresentative sample; although the sample and 1980 county census figures
for gender and race were almost the same, the sample was more highly educated and younger than
the census figures.
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heard only a little about it. Nevertheless, 58 percent of the sample was able
to correctly identify the plaintiff as the party who won the case. Just one
person incorrectly identified the tobacco company as the winner of the
lawsuit.
Respondents were also asked if they remembered the amount that the jury
had awarded the Cipollone plaintiff. Just one-third gave an award amount, with
only eight respondents correctly recalling that the jury had awarded the
plaintiff a total of $400,000.124 Those giving incorrect awards overestimated
1 25
the amount by a two-to-one margin.
We then told them about the facts of the case and the jury's actual verdict,
and asked several questions about their reaction to the case. Reactions to the
verdict were split, with 39 percent supporting and 45 percent opposing the
verdict. Most of our respondents felt that the $400,000 award was too high.
Although the Cipollone plaintiffs introduced internal industry documents to
support their contention that the tobacco companies had engaged in a
conspiracy to mislead the public about the dangers of smoking, the jury
dismissed the conspiracy claim. 126 Our respondents were similarly unlikely to
perceive the tobacco companies as being involved in a conspiracy.
Analysis of the respondents' views on smokers and tobacco companies
indicated that they held strong views of individual responsibility for smoking.
Smokers were seen as fully informed about the negative consequences of
indulging in their vice; even nicotine addiction was perceived as no excuse for
engaging in personally injurious behavior. In the eyes of these respondents,
the responsibility for smoking rested squarely on the shoulders of the smokers
themselves. For example, 95 percent agreed that "with all the warnings
today, if cigarette smokers die of cancer, it's their own fault." In key ways,
respondents absolved the tobacco companies for marketing a harmful
product. Most people saw the tobacco companies as meeting their obligation
to inform consumers about health risks, and saw present regulatory laws as
generally adequate.
Another strong theme was the belief that many lawsuits against companies
were illegitimate. Eight out of ten respondents believed that there are far too
many frivolous lawsuits today; six out of ten saw the threat of lawsuits as
interfering with the development of new and useful products. And plaintiffs
124. The median estimated award of $500,000 was quite close to the actual award, but the mean
award was $16.2 million, reflecting the extreme overestimates of the award by some of our
respondents.
125. The scanty and faulty recollections are interesting in terms of what Galanter, following
Mnookin and Kornhauser's classic article, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979), calls "jury shadows." GalanterJury Shadows: Reflections on the CivilJury and the
Litigation Explosion, in M. ARNOLD, B. BABBIrr, M. GALANTERJ. GUINTHER & D. HIGGENBOTHAM, THE
AMERICAN CIVIL JURY 15 (1987). The results of this admittedly nonrepresentative survey of
recollections hint that people are likely to remember who won a case but little else. Few of the other
details about the case appear to survive even a couple of weeks.
126. Daynard & Morin, supra note 121, at 54; Singer, They Didn't Really Blame the Cigarette Makers,
AM. LAW., Sept. 1988, at 31. To the majority of jurors, the company's actions "just seemed like
business as usual, the kind of thing you'd expect from any major industry." Id. at 35.
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in tobacco company lawsuits were perceived as "just trying to blame someone
else for their problems." Perceptions that lawsuits were often illegitimate
were strongly linked to opposition to the Cipollone verdict.
This evidence of public hostility toward plaintiffs who sue the tobacco
companies converges in a remarkable way with posttrial interviews of the
Cipollone jurors.' 2 7 The interviews painted a picture of a divided jury, the
majority of which held strong opinions that Rose Cipollone was largely
responsible for her own cancer death and deserved no compensation from the
cigarette manufacturers.1 28 The defense strategy of demonstrating that Rose
Cipollone was highly aware of the dangers of smoking convinced at least four
jurors that the cigarette company should not be held responsible for her
injury.' 29 However, the two other jurors were more sympathetic to the
plaintiffs. As one of the defense-oriented jurors stated about the others, "if
they had their whole say, [they] would have found [the tobacco companies]
guilty of anything and everything." 130 The jury agreed to compromise upon a
modest damage award to Rose Cipollone's husband.'13 The Cipollone jurors
reflected some of the same tensions and ambivalence that are prevalent in
public reactions toward holding corporations responsible for individual
32
behavior. 1

Thus, while scholars point to evidence indicating that the public is now
predisposed to holding businesses and other group entities liable for injuries,
there are manifestations of a contrary ethic of personal responsibility. This
widely supported social norm has no doubt contributed to the success of
various efforts to limit corporate and business liability during the most recent
wave of tort reform. In the 1980's, tort reformers have called for new
limitations on the liability of collective entities; insurance and business groups
have successfully lobbied state legislatures to enact laws limiting business
33
liability and damages.'

127. Singer, supra note 126. One caveat about relying on this article for a complete picture of the
Cipollone jury is that only the four pro-defense jurors consented to be interviewed; the two proplaintiffjurors refused to be interviewed by Singer. A brief report of several juror interviews is given
in 3 Jurors Now Say Tobacco Companies Should Not Pay, The News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 4,
1988, at 4A.
128. Singer, supra note 126.
129. Id. at 32.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 31.
132. The survey findings and juror interviews indicate that when individuals are perceived as
knowledgeable about and able to control their own injuries, judgments of corporate and business
responsibility are less likely. Therefore, if they were able to overcome the problems inherent in
proving harm from second-hand smoke, "passive" smokers should be more likely to prevail against
the tobacco companies than those who willingly light up.

133. U.S. ATVrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP (1986); AM. BAR ASS'N,
REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (1987).
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V
CONCLUSION

Historical and archival studies show an increasing business presence in the
courts. Past research on jury decisionmaking gives us reason to be optimistic
that lay juries are up to the task of comprehending and assessing liability in
the vast majority of cases involving businesses and corporations. Thejury has
considerable strength as a factfinder. By pooling the collective wisdom of six
or twelve citizens in group deliberation, the jury reduces the chance that
factual misunderstandings will lead to faulty verdicts. That is an important
advantage, because judges and jurors alike may have difficulty understanding
the scientific, technical, economic, and statistical evidence characteristic of
many business cases. As investigators continue to examine the influence of
such testimony on juries, they should also study how any problems of
evidentiary understanding can be ameliorated. Some alterations in traditional
jury trials-permitting jurors to ask questions of expert witnesses, or dividing
issues to be considered by juries in complex trials, to name just two-may be
necessary to ensure the fullest possible comprehension of the central facts in
complicated cases involving business wrongdoing.
Research indicates that juries might well take a distinctive approach to
evaluating corporate and business wrongdoing, holding corporations and
individuals to different standards. It is not yet clear under what
circumstances this will occur, nor why juries treat businesses differently.
Possibly, juries are simply reflecting current social norms of increased
corporate responsibility for wrongdoing. Alternatively, their judgments could
reveal anticorporate bias. Yet even in cases involving some of the most
negatively evaluated businesses around-the tobacco companies-juries show
remarkable restraint in judging corporate culpability. One task for
researchers will be to explore what facilitates or impedes perceptions of
business responsibility. Do the size, reputation, and financial status of the
corporation affect judgments of liability and damages? Gaining knowledge of
the circumstances under which people will and will not hold corporate and
business entities liable is a critical step toward understanding how juries
respond to cases involving business and corporate wrongdoing. It will also be
of interest to learn what life experiences or demographic characteristics
contribute to expansive or restricted views of the responsibility of
corporations.
In developing a comprehensive picture of jury decisionmaking in business
cases, an important step is fuller documentation of the kinds of cases and
range of issues and evidence juries most frequently confront. In discussing
the evaluation of corporate responsibility, this article has often counterposed
the individual and the corporation. Future work will have to differentiate
more systematically than has been possible here cases in which individuals sue
businesses from those in which businesses sue one another. This study has
barely touched upon some of the fascinating issues that arise in assessing the
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responsibility of individuals within businesses and corporations. 134 For
example, under what circumstances will jurors judge corporate directors
responsible for harms caused by a subordinate? Do the perceptions of jurors
and the lay public converge with legal rules about the responsibility of
corporate actors within organizations?
In closing, it is important to note the highly charged and partisan context
in which jury competence in business cases is evaluated and judged. Some
people have argued that the intricacies of modern business disputes render
them unfit for trial by jury. These critics would probably concede that the
criminal jury continues to serve an important function in contemporary
society as a protector of individual liberty, but would contend that the civil
jury, particularly in complicated business trials, has outlived its utility. Legally
trained judges and scientific experts might be better able to comprehend and
135
decide the affairs of business.

Yet juries in business cases play an important political role, one that could
be considered just as significant as the jury's function in the protection of
individual liberty in criminal trials.' 3 6 Juries deciding business cases are in a
position to reflect in their verdicts contemporary norms about appropriate
business standards and responsibilities. Ultimately, albeit imperfectly, jury
verdicts help to regulate the conduct of business and corporate entities in our
society. As Lempert notes, "complex cases-such as large-scale antitrust
litigation-are some of the most 'political' cases that the system hears. Vast
sums of money are involved, and the structure of the nation's largest
companies may be at issue. The power of businesses vis-a-vis consumers is
inescapably implicated."' 13 7 It is understandable that there might be
resistance on the part of businesses and corporations to the public control
inherent in the institution of the jury, and that others might strenuously
attempt to counteract this resistance. One consequence of this state of affairs
is that research findings about the jury in business cases may be swiftly
incorporated into partisan arguments for and against the jury. For example,
work that aims to point out problem areas and to assist jury factfinding could
be seized upon as evidence that juries are incompetent to decide such cases by
those who prefer to sidestep popular control in the form of thejury. Balanced
and objective presentations of research on the jury's evaluation of business
cases are thus imperative. Those of us who study the jury in such cases must
pay particular attention to the potential uses to which our research might be
put.'

38

134.
See I K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 99-150 (1984); R. HAMILTON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 378-492 (3d ed. 1986).

135. See, e.g., Drazan, supra note 1.
136. See, e.g., Lemperi, supra note 38, at 80-84. Lempert maintains that civil jury decisionmaking
promotes important social values.
137. Id. at 84.
138. See Daniels, The Question ofJury Competence and the Politics of CivilJusticeReform: Symbols, Rhetoric,
and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269.

